A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
β Scribed by L. Samuelson
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Year
- 1987
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 420 KB
- Volume
- 16
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0020-7276
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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