Scholars have usually translated the term sddhyasama ocurring in early Sanskrit philosophical texts as petitio principii. Curiously enough, H. N. Randle used 'petitio principii' to translate prakaran, asama, one of the five fallacies of inference mentioned in the Nydyas~tra. 1 While commenting on s6dhyasama, however, Randle remarked:
This dearly resembles the preceding fallacy (prakara.nasama) in being a kind of begging the question: and this kinship with the previous fallacy is no doubt indicated by the word 'and' with which the present sfttra commences. 2 Randle expressed also a word of caution regarding the use of'sddhyasama' in the Mgdhyamika texts. Professor K. Bhattacharya in his Note a shows that Randle's misgivings about the interpretation of sddhyasama in the Madhyamika texts were right. I shall try to show here that the usual translation of sddhyasama in the Ny~ya context as petitio principii (which even Randle seems to have suggested) is not only imprecise but also incorrect.
Sddhyasama, like petitio principii, is a fallacy in the argument and hence can be better explained in the context of an argument. First, we must be clear about what we understand by petitio principii as well as what we understand by a logical fallacy. It is better to begin with the notion of fallacy.. Strictly speaking, a fallacy is an invalid or unsound form of argument. An argument or reasoning involves a transition from a set of premises or evidences to a conclusion. A false belief is not called a fallacy since it does not involve an argument. From a practical point of view, however, 'fallacy' is very often used in a much extended sense. Traditionally, any mistake or confusion in the context of an argument or proof is called a fallacy. Thus, apart from fallacies that can be called 'formal' because of their relation with some formal logical system, there are fallacies in nondeductive inferences as well as fallacies in philosophic arguments or dis-