A model of a 2-player stopping game with priority and asynchronous observation
β Scribed by D. M. Ramsey
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2007
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 194 KB
- Volume
- 66
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0340-9422
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