✦ LIBER ✦

A general model of insurance under adverse selection

✍ Scribed by Michael Landsberger; Isaac Meilijson

Publisher: Springer
Year: 1999
Tongue: English
Weight: 151 KB
Volume: 14
Category: Article
ISSN: 0938-2259
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050297

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