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A further result on the core of voting games

✍ Scribed by M. Salles; R. E. Wendell

Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Year: 1977
Tongue: English
Weight: 311 KB
Volume: 6
Category: Article
ISSN: 0020-7276
DOI: 10.1007/bf01770873

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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