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A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game

✍ Scribed by Ngo Van Long; Gerhard Sorger

Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Year
2010
Tongue
English
Weight
221 KB
Volume
18
Category
Article
ISSN
1435-246X

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