In "Kierkegaard on Belief, Faith, and Explanation," David Wisdo criticizes accounts which reify the Kierkegaardian metaphor of a "leap" of faith. 1 He rejects, for example, the kind of account offered by Louis P. Pojman, in The Logic of Subjectivity, maintaining that "a philosophical account, such as Pojman's, which suggests that Kierkegaard wants to explain the acquisition of faith by appealing to the will is fundamentally misguided. ''2 This rejection of such self-described "volitionalist" accounts is ultimately based on the claim that Kierkegaard (or more precisely, Climacus) would reject "any philosophical explanation which purports to explain the acquisition of faith. ''3 That is, one cannot appeal to a "decision" in explaining the "wonder" which is faith because one cannot appeal to any human activity -faith is a "wonder" and a "miracle" which as such is not susceptible to "explanation." Wisdo's attempt to argue against any "explanation" of faith, however, indirectly raises important questions about the relation in the Climacus works between the "condition" and the "happy passion" of faith, and consequently, of the character of that faith, and thus, I suggest, reveals the need for a redescription and re-evaluation of the much-debated "volitionalist" vs. "nonvolitionalist" (or "anti-volitionalist") interpretations of faith in the Climacus works. The reconsideration to which Wisdo's essay prompts us will thus have implications which reach farther than the particular dispute in which he himself engages. At the very least it will lead to greater precision in determining differences between alternative interpretations of faith (i.e., alternative accounts of the relation between the 'condition,' 'faith,' and the realization of the truth). More importantly, I suggest that this reconsideration will show that, even if a volitionalist account (in which the role of the will is seen as a "decision") is untrue to Climacus's presentation of Christian faith, Wisdo's critique of such accounts issues in