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Zero-Knowledge Cooperation in Dilemma Games

✍ Scribed by STEFFEN HUCK; HANS-THEO NORMANN; JÖRG OECHSSLER

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2003
Tongue
English
Weight
153 KB
Volume
220
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-5193

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis

We consider a very simple adaptive rule that induces cooperative behavior in a large class of dilemma games. The rule has a Pavlovian flavor and can be described as win-continue, lose-reverse. It assumes no knowledge about the underlying structure of the environment (the "rules of the game") and requires very little cognitive effort. Both features make it an appealing candidate for explaining the emergence of cooperative behavior in non-human species.

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