argues that there is nothing especially wrong with racial discrimination. He does this in the context of reverse discrimination or affirmative action, arguing that only if there is something particularly wrong with racial discrimination, in comparison with wrongs such as theft, fraud or murder, are affirmative action programmes justified. He says, "(I)f I owe Mr. X a job because his ancestors were discriminated against, don't I owe Mr. Y the same if his ancestors were defrauded? I believe the answer must be yes: there is nothing special about acts of discrimination." (pp. 226-227 "Is Racial Discrimination Special?"; all following quotes are from this article). He concludes by saying, "While racial discrimination is wrong, it is only one wrong among many and has no special credit on our moral attention. Past discrimination no more deserves extraordinary compensation than many other wrongs. And any employment policy which does treat racial discrimination as special is arbitrary and irrational." (p. 232).
Without wishing to get entangled in the whole issue of affirmative action, I would like to answer Levin's question by pointing out some aspects of the matter which he has overlooked and which provide at least a prima facie case for the mounting of compensatory programmes.
Where Levin goes wrong should emerge as I go through his arguments for the ordinary status of racial discrimination. He begins by pointing out that "Racial discrimination is not the only wrong that can be committed against someone, and indeed it is far from the worst. I would rather be denied a job because I am Jewish than be murdered. My murderer violates my rights and handicaps my children much more seriously than someone who keeps me out of medical school." Here and throughout the paper Levin treats racial discrimination as if it were a particular kind of morally wrong act, and as if a society characterised by racial discrimination were simply one where such acts occurred. Fraud can be treated thus. There is no more to fraud than many different fraudulent acts committed from a variety of motives. If in a society no specific acts of a clearly defined sort occur, then there is no fraud in that society. This is not the case with racial discrimination. Suppose that a society fifteen years ago passed a law to the effect