In this brief essay we will articulate some elementary, though frequently overlooked, logical relations that obtain within the normative domain. Our argument does not depend on any substantive normative presuppositions about what is good or right. Nor do we make any universal assertions. Our argument is, on the contrary, conditional. It does not point to a universally binding reason for being moral because it does not apply to persons who earnestly believe that they are never entitled to any moral consideration from others.
We suggest two things. First, that those who believe they are entitled to moral consideration from others cannot rationally, that is, without inconsistency, reject the obligation to extend moral consideration to others. Second, those who reject the view of an objective foundation for moral value judgments cannot rationally, that is, without inconsistency, claim that they deserve moral consideration from others.
Only one normative -as opposed to prudential -answer to the question "Why be moral?" does not presuppose any substantive view of moral value. We propose: if you believe that in virtue of some of your attributes, whatever they may be, you deserve consideration and respect in the deliberations and actions of others -and what other basis for membership in the moral community can there be? -then you are rationally obligated, as a matter of logical consistency, to extend the same consideration and respect to others with the same attributes insofar as your deliberations and subsequent actions affect them.
In the final analysis individuals can reject the claims of morality in only two ways. First, they can surrender all rights to consideration and respect insofar as they are affected by the deliberations and actions of others. In this case they can never claim that any person ought to act, or ought not to act, in any particular fashion insofar as they are affected; that is, such persons