Who Owns Outer Space?: International Law, Astrophysics, and the Sustainable Development of Space (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, Series Number 176)

✍ Scribed by Michael Byers, Aaron Boley

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Year: 2023
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 428
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

From Space debris to asteroid strikes to anti-satellite weapons, humanity's rapid expansion into Space raises major environmental, safety, and security challenges. In this book, Michael Byers and Aaron Boley, an international lawyer and an astrophysicist, identify and interrogate these challenges and propose actionable solutions. They explore essential questions from, 'How do we ensure all of humanity benefits from the development of Space, and not just the world's richest people?' to 'Is it possible to avoid war in Space?' Byers and Boley explain the essential aspects of Space science, international law, and global governance in a fully transdisciplinary and highly accessible way. Addressing the latest and emerging developments in Space, they equip readers with the knowledge and tools to engage in current and critically important legal, policy, and scientific debates concerning the future development of Space. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
Half-title
Series information
Title page
Copyright information
Dedication
Contents
List of Figures
Acknowledgements
Note
Introduction
Who Owns Outer Space?
Who Owns Outer Space?
Who Owns Outer Space?
Who Owns Outer Space?
Who Owns Outer Space?
So Who Owns Outer Space?
1 Space Tourism
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Suborbital Tourism
1.3 Orbital Tourism
1.4 The Duty to Rescue
1.5 The 1968 Rescue Agreement
1.6 The Duty to Rescue and Commercial Spacecraft
1.7 The Duty to Rescue and Non-governmental Passengers on Commercial Spacecraft
1.8 The Duty to Rescue and Suborbital Flights
1.9 Climate Impacts
1.10 Who Will Rescue the Martians?
1.11 Conclusion
2 Mega-constellations
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Why Mega-constellations?
2.3 Space Debris and Orbital Congestion
2.4 Increased Collision Risk
2.5 Surface Impacts
2.6 Atmospheric Effects
2.6.1 Re-entering Satellites
2.6.2 Rocket Launches
2.7 Occupying Orbital Shells
2.8 Radio Spectrum
3 Mega-constellations and International Law
3.1 Collisions Involving Satellites
3.1.1 Soft Law
3.1.1.1 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee Guidelines
3.1.1.2 UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
3.1.1.3 UN Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities
3.1.2 Liability for Collisions
3.1.3 Establishing Fault
3.1.4 Liability for Indirect Damage?
3.1.5 At the International Level, States Are Liable, Not Companies
3.1.6 Liability and National Courts
3.1.7 International Law-Making before, Not after, a Major Disaster
3.2 Astronomy, Mega-constellations, and International Law
3.2.1 Astronomical Concerns
3.2.2 Astronomy and International Law
3.2.3 Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty
3.2.3.1 Is Astronomy a Form of 'Exploration and Use'?
3.2.3.1.1 Ordinary Meaning
3.2.3.1.2 The Context of the Terms
3.2.3.1.3 The Object and Purpose of the Treaty
3.2.3.1.4 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
3.2.3.2 The Duty of 'Due Regard'
3.2.3.2.1 The Ordinary Meaning of the Terms
3.2.3.2.2 The Context of the Terms
3.2.3.2.3 The Object and Purpose of the Treaty
3.2.3.2.4 Relevant Rules of International Law
3.2.3.3 Conclusion to the Treaty Interpretation
3.2.4 Mega-constellations in US Courts
3.2.5 Bringing Licensing States into Compliance with International Law
4 Abandoned Rocket Bodies
4.1 Space Debris Generation
4.2 Light Pollution
4.3 Uncontrolled Rocket Body Re-entries
4.3.1 Assessing Casualty Risk
4.3.2 Switching to Controlled Re-entries
4.3.3 Solving the Collective-Action Problem
5 Space Mining
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Space Mining and International Law
5.3 Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty
5.3.1 Ordinary Meaning
5.3.2 The Context of the Terms
5.3.3 Object and Purpose
5.3.4 Subsequent Agreement
5.3.5 Subsequent Practice
5.3.6 Negotiating Records
5.4 Recent Efforts by the United States to Advance Its Position
5.4.1 Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act
5.4.2 Executive Order and Artemis Accords
5.4.3 NASA Contracting to Purchase Lunar Regolith
5.5 Risks of the US Approach
5.5.1 Loss of Science Opportunities
5.5.2 Planetary Protection
5.5.3 Dust and Debris Streams
5.5.4 Asteroid Trajectory Changes
5.5.5 Space Companies as Actors in International Law-Making?
5.5.6 Fragmentation of the Space Law Regime
5.5.7 Safety Zones and Long-Term Stewardship
5.6 The Working Group on Space Resources
5.7 Optimal Multilateral Outcomes
5.7.1 Clarifying Existing Obligations
5.7.2 Applying the Precautionary Principle
5.8 A New Multilateral Treaty
5.9 Conclusion
6 Planetary Defence
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Detection
6.3 Deflection
6.3.1 Kinetic Impactors
6.3.2 Nuclear Explosive Devices
6.3.3 The Long Game: Mass Drivers and Gravity Tractors
6.4 Comets
6.5 International Co-operation
6.5.1 International Asteroid Warning Network
6.5.2 Space Mission Planning Advisory Group
6.6 Tabletop Exercises
6.7 Legal Issues
6.7.1 Information sharing
6.7.2 Assisting Other States
6.7.3 Nuclear Explosive Devices
6.7.4 Nuclear Explosive Devices and the Outer Space Treaty
6.7.5 The Limited Test Ban Treaty
6.7.6 Nuclear Explosive Devices and Customary International Law
6.8 Who Decides?
6.8.1 Space Agencies Acting Collectively
6.8.2 A Decision-Making Matrix
6.8.3 The UN Security Council
6.8.4 Individual States
6.9 State Responsibility
6.9.1 Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness
6.9.1.1 Consent
6.9.1.2 Distress
6.9.1.3 Necessity
6.9.2 States Are Responsible for Non-State Actors
6.10 Liability
6.10.1 Liability for False Alarms?
6.11 Developing Capabilities for Planetary Defence
6.12 Precautionary Planetary Defence
7 Space Security
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Preserving Safe Access to Space: The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty
7.3 ASAT Weapons and Space Debris
7.4 From Reagan to Clinton
7.5 China's 2007 ASAT Weapon Test
7.6 The United States' 2008 Satellite Intercept
7.7 India's 2019 ASAT Weapon Test
7.8 Russia's 2021 ASAT Weapon Test
7.9 Diplomatic Initiatives
7.10 Missile Defence and Space Debris
7.11 Are Debris Concerns Outweighed by the Purpose of Missile Defence Systems?
7.12 Militarisation of Cis-lunar Space
7.12.1 Other Risks
7.12.2 Possible Solutions
8 Anti-satellite Weapons and International Law
8.1 Kinetic ASAT Weapon Tests and the Outer Space Treaty
8.1.1 Kinetic ASAT Weapon Tests This Century
8.1.2 Responses to the 2007 Chinese ASAT Weapon Test
8.1.3 Changes in Practice after the 2007 Chinese ASAT Weapon Test
8.1.4 Debates and Decisions within Intergovernmental Organisations
8.1.5 The Indian ASAT Weapon Test: Conduct and Responses
8.1.6 Responses to the 2019 Indian ASAT Weapon Test
8.1.7 The 2021 Russian ASAT Weapon Test
8.1.8 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 75/36 and 76/231
8.1.9 The 2022 United States 'Unilateral Declaration'
8.2 Kinetic ASAT Weapon Tests and Customary International Law
8.3 Non-kinetic Technologies
8.4 ASAT Weapons and the Right of Self-Defence
8.4.1 Armed Attack
8.4.2 Necessity and Proportionality
8.4.2.1 Military Satellites
8.4.2.2 Dual-Use Satellites
8.4.2.3 Self-Defence and Space Debris
8.5 ASAT Weapons and International Humanitarian Law
8.5.1 Military Necessity
8.5.2 Distinction
8.5.3 Proportionality
9 Conclusion: Where To from Here?
9.1 The International Space Station
9.2 Cospas-Sarsat
9.3 Space and the Ukraine War
9.4 War in Space Has No Good Outcomes
Bibliography
Index