What happens when majority rule breaks down?

✍ Scribed by Colin E. Bell

• Book ID: 104627981
• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1978
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 300 KB
• Volume: 33
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0048-5829
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00118362

✦ Synopsis

Computational results of Niemi and Weisberg are extended to investigate the number of alternatives in the top cycle set (possible winning alternatives in a sequence of paixwise votes) when there is no Condorcet winner. With n alternatives we assume a large number of voters each equally likely to select any of the n ! preference orderings. If no Condorcet winner exists, the number of members of the top cycle set is always more likely to be n or n-1 than between 3 and n-2 inclusive. As n grows the probability that all alternatives are in the top cycle set approaches 1.