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minimisation. 7. Generalising state-based minimisation. 8. Tailor-made techniques. 9. Narratives in the situation calculus. 10. Incomplete narratives and concurrent actions. 11. The foundations of logic programming. 12. Logic programs for reasoning about action. 13. Simplifying and extending the event calculus. 14. A circumseriptive calculus of events. 15. Applying the calculus of events. 16. Forced separation. 17. Explanation: The assimilation of observations. Epilogue: Is the frame problem solved? Bibliography. Appendices. A. Proof of Theorem 9.7.5. B. Proof of Theorem 14.5.2. C. Temporal projection algorithms. D. Proof of Theorem 15.5.3. Index. Desiqninq Incentive Requlation for the Telecommunications Industry. By David E. M. Sappington and Dennis L. Weisman. MIT Press/AIE Press, Cambridge, MA/Washington, DC. (1996). 388 pages. $35.00. Contents:
Foreword. Acknowledgments. About the authors. 1. Introduction and overview. 2. Today's telecommunications industry. 3. A review of existing regulatory plans. 4. Regulatory goals and resources. 5. Selecting performance criteria and reward structures. 6. Designing options in incentive regulation plans. 7. Fostering regulatory commitment powers. 8. Competition, regulation, and deregulation. 9. RBOC entry into interLATA long-distance markets. 10. Pitfalls in measuring the effects of incentive regulation. 11. Empirical studies of the effects of incentive regulation. 12. Conclusion. Glossary. References. Case and regulatory proceeding index. Name index.
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