Voting power and at-large representation
โ Scribed by Paul H. Edelman
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2004
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 136 KB
- Volume
- 47
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0165-4896
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
This paper compares the theoretical bases of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power for a legislature with weighted voting. Definitions based on probabilistic-voting assumptions, useful both as behavioral descriptions and for computation in empirical applications, are compared in ter
Approval voting allows each voter to vote for as many candidates as he wishes in a multicandidate election. Previous studies show that approval voting compares favorably with other practicable election systems. The present study examines the extent to which votes for different numbers of candidates