✦ LIBER ✦

VOTING, LOBBYING, AND THE DECENTRALIZATION THEOREM

✍ Scribed by BEN LOCKWOOD

Book ID: 111058656
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 2008
Tongue: English
Weight: 144 KB
Volume: 20
Category: Article
ISSN: 0954-1985
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00340.x

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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