๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

Voluntary purchase of public goods

โœ Scribed by Douglas J. Young


Publisher
Springer US
Year
1982
Tongue
English
Weight
649 KB
Volume
38
Category
Article
ISSN
0048-5829

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โœฆ Synopsis


This paper examines the application of Buchanan's 'independent adjustment' model of public good provision to individual donations to voluntary or non-profit organizations. An individual's donation function is a simple transformation of the Marshallian demand function; consequently donation functions 'reveal,' in principle, preferences for public goods. The existence of a taxsubsidy system sustaining a Pareto optimal level of provision is demonstrated, and the relationship to the existing subsidy scheme in the U.S. is examined. Finally, two implications of the model suggest that it is not appropriate as a representation of actual donor behavior. * This article is drawn primarily from the author's Ph.D. thesis written under the supervision of Burton A. Weisbrod at the Univei'sity of Wisconsin. Eugene Smolensky, W. Lee Hansen and Efraim Sadka have provided especially helpful comments. All errors remain the sole responsibility of the author. Financial support from the Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.


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