Public Choice 34 (1979) 69-85. All rights reserved.
Variation of the electorate: Veto and purge
✍ Scribed by Roy Gardner
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1983
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 516 KB
- Volume
- 40
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
In the paradigm social choice problem, there is a fixed set of alternatives and a fixed set of voters. This essay considers variations of the electorate when some subset of voters has a special voice on some subset of alternatives. We formalized such a situation by means of the veto function. We focus on stable veto functions, exhibit a stable liberal social choice function and promotion mechanism, and investigate a notion of stability for groups whose membership itself is the social state.
* The author wishes to thank P. Aranson, F. Breyer, A. Denzau, S. Matthews, R. Rosenthal, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The errors which remain are the author's own. A preliminary version was presented at the 1981 Public Choice Meetings.
📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES
Blair and Pollak (Econometrica (1982) 50: 931-943) prove that, if there are more alternatives than individuals, then, for every arrovian binary decision rule that is acyclic, there is at least one individual who has a veto power over a critical number of pairs of alternatives. If the number of indi
Les prises de positions, les programmes politiques ou encore les résultats précédents des candidats et des partis n'expliquent que partiellement leur succès électoral. D'autres mécanismes, plus simples, jouent aussi un rôle. Dans cet article, nous explorons l'influence de l'attractivité physique sur
Kramer suggested this problem to me and has contributed several helpful discussions. Charles Rosen expertly programmed and executed the simulation. I am grateful also for the assistance of Len Champney, Eileen Mauskopf, Nell Sheflin and Jim Wheeler. I am responsible for remaining errors.