The performance of individual agents in a group depends critically on the quality of information available to them about local and global goals and resources. In general, it is assumed that the more accurate and comprehensive the available information, the better is the expected performance of the individual and the group. This conclusion can be challenged in a number of scenarios. We investigate the use of limited information by agents in choosing betwen one of several different options, and conclude that if agents are kept ignorant about, or they deliberately ignore, any number of options, the group can converge faster to a stable and optimal configuration. We present a probabilistic analysis that sheds light on the observed phenomenon of quicker system convergence with less global information. This analysis suggests a desirable adaptive behavior on the part of individual agents. Experiments with agents following these adaptive behavior exhibits faster convergence. We also demonstrate how a couple of coalition formation schemes can improve the rate of convergence. A variable coalition formation mechanism is found to be more effective than a static one.