Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games

✍ Scribed by T. Börgers

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 1991
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 982 KB
• Volume: 8
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0176-1714
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00182448

✦ Synopsis

This paper studies the question whether there are nondictatorial procedures for collective decision making which ensure that collective decisions are Pareto-efficient if all agents choose strategies that are not weakly dominated. It is shown that contrary to what one might expect the answer is not entirely negative.

* This paper is a shortened and revised version of B6rgers (1989a). I would like to thank John Moore and Ariel Rubinstein for their comments on a very early version of this research. I have also benefited from the reactions of seminar participants in London, Visegard, Paris, and Basel. I am grateful to a referee and to an associate editor for helpful suggestions. 1 The precise definition of "dominance" is given in Sect. 2.