Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness

✍ Scribed by William S. Robinson

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Year: 2004
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 278
• Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Focusing on sensory experience and perception qualities to present a dualistic view of the mind (called Qualitative Event Realism), this book doesn't conform to the dominant materialist views. Its theory is relevant to the development of a science of consciousness now being pursued, not only by philosophers, but by researchers in psychology and the neurosciences.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 9
Acknowledgments......Page 13
Part I......Page 15
1 Introduction......Page 17
PERCEPTION AND OUR BASIC QUESTION......Page 19
ORGANIZATION OF THIS BOOK......Page 23
A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY......Page 25
2 Qualitative Event Realism......Page 28
Red Experiences?......Page 29
Inversion......Page 31
Error......Page 33
AFTERIMAGES AND EVENTS......Page 35
STRUCTURE AND LOCATION......Page 39
WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS?......Page 46
THE STATE OF THE ARGUMENT SO FAR......Page 48
3 Dualism......Page 50
REDUCTION AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS......Page 57
PROPERTY IDENTITY WITHOUT EXPLANATORY REDUCTION......Page 60
OUR LIMITED MINDS......Page 64
4 Representationalism......Page 67
THE P/T PROBLEM......Page 70
DIFFERENCES OF CONTENT......Page 73
DIFFERENCES OF REPRESENTATIONAL TYPE......Page 76
Noninferential Classification......Page 78
Nonconceptual Content......Page 80
Adverbialism and Intentional Inexistence......Page 82
CONCLUSION......Page 86
5 Transparency......Page 87
Representational Because Locational?......Page 90
Fear of Sense Data......Page 91
The Measurement Problem......Page 93
Conceptual Involvement......Page 95
The Sore Finger Argument......Page 96
A VARIANT OF TRANSPARENCY......Page 97
THE TRUE RELATION BETWEEN EXPERIENCE AND REPRESENTATION......Page 98
6 Higher Order Theories......Page 101
THE STONE OBJECTION AND SOME REPLIES......Page 106
A DILEMMA FOR HOT THEORY......Page 110
UNCONSCIOUS PAINS AND TASTES?......Page 112
All-Day Headaches......Page 113
Unfelt Pains......Page 115
Wine and Music......Page 117
BURDENS......Page 119
ARMSTRONG’S DRIVERS......Page 121
EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS......Page 127
QUADRANGLE BELLS AND OTHER PUZZLING CASES......Page 131
FUTURE EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR MONITORS?......Page 137
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HIGHER ORDER THEORIES......Page 142
8 Functionalism......Page 144
BEHAVIORISM......Page 147
HOMUNCULAR FUNCTIONALISM......Page 148
MICROFUNCTIONALISM......Page 152
IDENTITY AND SUPERVENIENCE......Page 154
9 Skepticism and the Causes of Qualitative Events......Page 157
SKEPTICISM VERSUS QER: HOW MAY WE PROCEED?......Page 159
EXCESSIVE DETERMINATENESS?......Page 162
INTERNALISM......Page 167
CONCLUSIONS......Page 170
10 Epiphenomenalism......Page 172
ANTIEPIPHENOMENALIST INTUITIONS......Page 174
SELF-STULTIFICATION......Page 179
CONTINGENCY AND KNOWLEDGE......Page 181
QUALITATIVE EVENTS AND KNOWLEDGE: A DILEMMA......Page 188
LOSS OF CONTROL......Page 192
Part II......Page 195
11 Unified Dualism......Page 197
KNOWING MATTER FROM INSIDE......Page 201
QUANTUM MECHANICS......Page 207
WHY THERE WILL ALWAYS BE ONE KIND OF EXPLANATORY GAP......Page 215
CONCLUSION......Page 219
A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT......Page 221
HOMOGENEITY......Page 228
CONTRAST WITH CHALMERS’S PRINCIPLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INVARIANCE......Page 231
HOMOGENEITY, COMPUTATION, AND “INFORMATION”......Page 238
INDEPENDENCE OF PATTERN FROM MEDIUM......Page 241
PANPSYCHISM......Page 247
ISN’T THIS STILL MERE CORRELATION?......Page 249
CONSERVATION......Page 255
THE NONTRANSITIVITY PROBLEM......Page 257
CONCLUSION......Page 263
References......Page 265
Index......Page 273