Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
โ Scribed by Chenghu Ma
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2000
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 243 KB
- Volume
- 24
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0165-1889
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
This occurs when a player uses a random device to guide his decision in situations where he has to make a choice among a set of mutually indi!erent acts and when all players know other players' random devices.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
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Shannon's theory of communication is discussed from the point of view of his concept of uncertainty. It is suggested that there are two information concepts in Shannon, two different uncertainties, and at least two different entropy concepts. Information science focuses on the uncertainty associated