𝔖 Bobbio Scriptorium
✦   LIBER   ✦

Truth-telling, dominant strategies, and iterative Groves mechanisms

✍ Scribed by Susan I. Cohen


Book ID
104633329
Publisher
Springer US
Year
1986
Tongue
English
Weight
522 KB
Volume
51
Category
Article
ISSN
0048-5829

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis


This essay demonstrates that if an organization uses a price-decomposition algorithm to solve a decentralized resource allocation problem, in which rewards are those of a Groves mechanism, then truth-telling remains a dominant-strategy equilibrium. Earlier work shows that for a general class of non-linear programming algorithms, truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium that weakly dominates all other Nash equilibria, but it is not necessarily a dominant-strategy equilibrium.


πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES