Truth-telling, dominant strategies, and iterative Groves mechanisms

✍ Scribed by Susan I. Cohen

• Book ID: 104633329
• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1986
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 522 KB
• Volume: 51
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0048-5829
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00128881

✦ Synopsis

This essay demonstrates that if an organization uses a price-decomposition algorithm to solve a decentralized resource allocation problem, in which rewards are those of a Groves mechanism, then truth-telling remains a dominant-strategy equilibrium. Earlier work shows that for a general class of non-linear programming algorithms, truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium that weakly dominates all other Nash equilibria, but it is not necessarily a dominant-strategy equilibrium.