Truth (Princeton Foundations of Contemporary Philosophy)

✍ Scribed by Alexis G. Burgess, John P. Burgess

• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Year: 2011
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 173
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

This is a concise, advanced introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. A blend of philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the tendency known as deflationism, according to which there is not much to say about the nature of truth. In clear language, Burgess and Burgess cover a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth-value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about truth, and semantic paradoxes from Alfred Tarski to Saul Kripke and beyond. Following a brief introduction that reviews the most influential traditional and contemporary theories of truth, short chapters cover Tarski, deflationism, indeterminacy, realism, antirealism, Kripke, and the possible insolubility of semantic paradoxes. The book provides a rich picture of contemporary philosophical theorizing about truth, one that will be essential reading for philosophy students as well as philosophers specializing in other areas.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover......Page 1
Title Page......Page 4
Copyright Page......Page 5
Table of Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 12
Acknowledgments......Page 14
Introduction......Page 16
1.1 Traditional Theories......Page 17
1.2 Contemporary Theories......Page 19
1.3 Paradoxes......Page 20
1.4 Plan......Page 22
1.5 Sentences......Page 25
1.6 Propositions......Page 27
2.1 “Semantic” Truth......Page 31
2.2 Object Language vs Metalanguage......Page 33
2.3 Recursive Definition......Page 37
2.4 Direct Definition......Page 39
2.5 Self-Reference......Page 43
2.6 Model Theory......Page 44
Deflationism......Page 48
3.1 Redundancy......Page 49
3.2 Other Radical Theories......Page 53
3.3 Disquotation......Page 56
3.4 Other Moderate Theories......Page 59
3.5 Sloganeering......Page 62
3.6 Reference......Page 64
Indeterminacy......Page 67
4.1 Presupposition......Page 68
4.2 Vagueness......Page 69
4.3 Denial, Disqualification, Deviance......Page 70
4.4 Doublespeak, Dependency, Defeatism......Page 74
4.5 Relativity......Page 76
4.6 Local vs Global......Page 80
5.1 Realism vs Deflationism......Page 83
5.2 Correspondence Theories......Page 85
5.3 Truthmaker Theories......Page 87
5.4 Physicalism......Page 89
5.5 Utility......Page 92
5.6 Normativity......Page 94
Antirealism......Page 98
6.1 Meaning and Truth......Page 99
6.2 Davidsonianism......Page 102
6.3 Dummettianism vs Davidsonianism......Page 105
6.4 Dummettianism vs Deflationism......Page 108
6.5 Holism......Page 111
6.6 Pluralism......Page 112
Kripke......Page 117
7.1 Kripke vs Tarski......Page 118
7.2 The Minimum Fixed Point......Page 120
7.3 Ungroundedness......Page 122
7.4 The Transfinite Construction......Page 124
7.5 Revision......Page 127
7.6 Axiomatics......Page 128
8.1 Paradoxical Reasoning......Page 131
8.2 “Revenge”......Page 133
8.3 Logical “Solutions”......Page 135
8.4 “Paraconsistency”......Page 138
8.5 Contextualist “Solutions”......Page 139
8.6 Inconsistency Theories......Page 142
Further Reading......Page 150
Bibliography......Page 158
Index......Page 168