Truth and Realism

✍ Scribed by Patrick Greenough, Michael P. Lynch

Year: 2006
Tongue: English
Leaves: 151
Category: Library

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis

Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.

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