Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXXVI

✍ Scribed by Ngoc Thanh Nguyen (editor), Ryszard Kowalczyk (editor), Anna Motylska-Kuźma (editor), Jacek Mercik (editor)

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 2021
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 172
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

These transactions publish research in computer-based methods of computational collective intelligence (CCI) and their applications in a wide range of fields such as performance optimization in IoT, big data, reliability, privacy, security, service selection, QoS and machine learning. This 36th issue contains 7 selected papers which present new findings and innovative methodologies as well as discuss issues and challenges in the field of collective intelligence from big data and networking paradigms while addressing security, privacy, reliability and optimality to achieve QoS to the benefit of final users

This is an open access book.

✦ Table of Contents

Preface
Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence
Contents
A Theoretical Examination of the Ranked Choice Voting Procedure
1 Introduction
2 Two Peculiar Features of the U.S. Electoral System
3 RCV as a Special Variant of STV
4 The Performance of RCV on Standard Criteria
4.1 Arrow's Conditions
4.2 Condorcet Criteria
4.3 Choice Set Variability Criteria
5 Modifying RCV
6 Concluding Remarks
References
A Game Theoretic Model of Searching for a Unique Good from a Large Set of Offers
1 Introduction
2 A Model of Search with an Individual Decision Maker
3 A Game Theoretic Model
4 Some Theoretical Results
4.1 A Similar Optimization Problem
4.2 A Similar Game Where the DMs Have Independent Preferences
5 A Procedure for Estimating the Nash Equilibrium and Value of the Original Game
6 Numerical Results
6.1 Mixed Equilibria
6.2 Accuracy in Estimating the Individual Payoffs
6.3 Effect of the Parameters of the Game
7 Conclusion
References
Operation Comfort of Multistate System vs. The Importance of Its Components
1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminaries
1.2 Investigation of Element Role in a Given State
1.3 Organization of the Paper
2 Multistate Systems
2.1 Coherent Multistate Systems
2.2 Introductory Characteristic for the Importance Measure
2.3 Nonrepairable Coherent Multistate Systems
2.4 Repairable Coherent Multistate Systems
3 State Dependent Importance Measure
4 Concluding Remarks
4.1 Summary
4.2 Important Direction of Further Investigations
A List of Symbols
B Endnotes
B.1 Risk
B.2 General Idea of Importance Measure
B.3 Review of Importance Measure Concepts
B.4 Cooperative Games vs. Semicoherent Systems
References
Implicit Power Indices for Measuring Indirect Control in Corporate Structures
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries on Power Indices and Cooperative Game Theory
2.1 Cooperative Game Theory and Simple Games
2.2 Power Indices
3 A General Framework of Implicit Indices for Indirect Control
3.1 Modelling of Corporate Shareholding Networks
3.2 Motivation and Illustration: A Corporate Network with 21 Players
3.3 The Approaches by Karos-Peters, Mercik-Łobos and Stach-Mercik
3.4 Generalizing the Stach-Mercik and Mercik-Łobos Implicit Indices
4 Software Structure and Requirements
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Minimal Winning and Vulnerable Coalitions for Our 21-Player Example
5.2 Comparisons Within the Stach-Mercik Framework
5.3 Investigating More Than One Regression
5.4 The Null Investor Removable Property
6 Conclusions and Further Developments
References
1% Tax in Public Benefit Organizations: Determinants of Its Share in Organizations’ Total Revenues – Analysis of 3rd Sector in Poland
1 Introduction
2 Public Benefit Organizations (PBOs) and Mechanism of 1% Tax
3 Data and Method
3.1 Sample
3.2 Dependent Variable
3.3 Independent Variables
4 Results
5 Discussion
References
Reformulation of Some Indices Using Null Player Free Winning Coalitions
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries on Simple Games
3 New Reformulations of Some Power Indices
3.1 Nevison Index
3.2 König and Bräuninger Index
3.3 Banzhaf Index
3.4 Rae Index
3.5 Coleman’s Indices
3.6 Relationships Between Power Indices
4 Concluding Comments
References
Analysis and Modeling of Activity-Selection Behavior in Collaborative Knowledge-Building
1 Introduction
2 Related Work
2.1 Role-Playing Behavior
2.2 Triggering/Dependency Among Users
2.3 Group Composition
3 Domain Analysis: Contribution Behavior of Users in Stack Exchange Websites
3.1 Data Set
3.2 Task Vectors and Activity-Selection Behavior' 3.3User-Distribution' Across Activities
3.4 Triggering/Dependency Among Users of a Q&A System
4 A Cognitive Model for the Interactive User Behavior in Collaborative Knowledge-Building
4.1 Simulation of the Model
5 Analysis of the Model
5.1 Total Knowledge Generated in the System
5.2 Computing the Optimal User-Distribution
5.3 m = 2
5.4 m = 3
6 Model Application on StackExchange Websites
7 Discussion
8 Conclusion
A Appendix
A.1 Stack Exchange Data Set Statistics
A.2 Stack Exchange Policies Regarding Commenting and Editing
A.3 Uni-C, Bi-C and Tri-C in Stack Exchange Websites
A.4 Proportion of Uni-C Across the Activities in Stack Exchange Websites
A.5 Method Used for Finding the Optimal k
A.6 User-Distribution Obtained For Stack Exchange Websites
A.7 Model Parameters for the Systems Studied in Chapter 3
References
Author Index