Toward rapprochement: Comments on the role of biological science within cognitive neuroscience and radical behaviorism
✍ Scribed by Stephen S. Ilardi; David Feldman
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2001
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 26 KB
- Volume
- 57
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0021-9762
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
In his final set of comments in this series, Plaud (2001) accuses us of having arrived at an "erroneous conclusion" regarding the role of biological phenomena within radical behaviorism (RB). Specifically, Plaud believes we have mistakenly inferred that the RB position excludes biological phenomena from consideration in causal accounts of behavior. Because the satisfactory resolution of this issue is, we believe, of central importance to the prospects for theoretical rapprochement between the RB and cognitive neuroscience (CN) perspectives, we now attempt to clarify this point of contention.
For the record, we do not dispute Skinner's (1974Skinner's ( , 1987Skinner's ( , 1988) ) repeatedly having acknowledged that biological science is of relevance to the study of behaving organisms. For example, Skinner suggested that, although the organism's behavior is ultimately under the control of environmental contingencies, the intraorganismic events that constitute behavior are describable (in principle, at least) by the biological sciences. Skinner wrote, "The physiologist of the future will tell us all that can be known about what is happening inside the behaving organism" (1974, p. 236), though such discoveries "cannot invalidate the laws of a science of behavior" (p. 237). Regarding the interrelationship of RB psychology and neuroscience, Skinner opined, ". . . a science of behavior is not yet indebted to neuroscience, but there is an enormous debt in the other direction. Behavioral science gives neuroscience its assignment." (Skinner, 1988, p. 470).
Skinner was apparently somewhat optimistic about the prospects for a future integration of the biosciences with radical behavioral psychology, but only to the extent that such integration could be said to occur on Skinner's own terms-that is, with behavioral psychology giving the biosciences their assignment! We believe Skinner's-and by extension, Plaud's-position on the relationship of biological science to radical behavioral psychology may best be summarized as follows: