To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting
โ Scribed by Guillermo Owen; Bernard Grofman
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1984
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 638 KB
- Volume
- 42
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
One paradox of voting states that, in a general election, in which many citizens vote, the probability that a single voter can affect the outcome is so small that in general citizens have no rational reason for voting. However, if all citizens accept this reasoning, then none will vote, and so each vote has a large probability of affecting the outcome. Hence all should vote after all. The adoption of mixed strategies resolves this paradox: if each citizen adopts a certain (small) probability of voting, then the actual number of citizens voting will be just enough to make it worth those citizens' while to vote. A Nash equilibrium point thus occurs. Here we compute Nash equilibria for the simple case of majority voting; for the more complicated case of composite voting (for example, as in a presidential election), we draw certain qualitative inferences.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
## Abstract We conducted two studies addressing abstaining from voting in union representation elections. In Study 1 of a faculty representation election, we showed that compared to voters abstainers possessed less extreme work and union attitudes, believed less in the ability of their vote to affe
There is very little in the literature on the frequency with which voting paradoxes could be expected in the real world. The point of this note is to add a little, unfortunately very little, to this scant information and to suggest a method of getting more. One of the authors was on a search committ