Time, Identity and the Self: Essays on Metaphysics (Synthese Library, 442)

✍ Scribed by Brian Garrett, Jeremiah Joven Joaquin (editor)

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 2022
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 224
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

This volume contains twenty-four essays by the British/Australian analytic metaphysician, Brian Garrett. These essays are followed by four short dialogues that emphasize and summarize some of the main points of the essays and discuss new perspectives that have emerged since their original publication.
The volume covers topics on the metaphysics of time, the nature of identity, and the nature and importance of persons and human beings. The chapters constitute the fruits of almost four decades of philosophical research, from Brian’s two award-winning essays, published in Analysis in 1983 and The Philosophical Quarterly in 1992, to his latest ideas about Fatalism and the Grandfather Paradox.

This book will be of interest to students and professional philosophers in the field of analytic philosophy.

✦ Table of Contents

Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgements
Contents
Part I Time
1 Thank Goodness That's Over'' Revisited 1.1 Prior's Puzzle and the Two Views About the Nature of Time 1.2 Responses to Prior's Puzzle 1.3 A Riposte 1.4 Concluding Remarks References 2 Experience and Time 2.1 Justifying Our Bias Towards the Present 2.2 Value and the Metaphysics of Time 2.3 Concluding Remarks References 3 Max Black and Backward Causation 3.1 Black's Main Claim 3.2 Black's Two Arguments 3.3 Analysing Black's Arguments References 4 Dummett on Reasons to Act and Bringing About the Past 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Dissecting Dummett's Argument 4.3 The Second Sceptical Argument 4.4 The Third Sceptical Argument 4.5 Conclusion References 5 Dummett on McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Dummett on McTaggart's Argument 5.3 Temporal versus Spatial Immersion 5.4 Observer-independence References 6 A Note on the Grandfather Paradox 6.1 Lewis's Theory 6.2 Against Lewis's Theory 6.3 Tim and Tom 6.4 Conclusion References 7 Bulletproof Grandfathers, David Lewis, and `Can't'-Judgements 7.1 A General Argument 7.2 Misapplied Contextualism 7.3 A Time Symmetry Argument 7.4 Alternative Arguments 7.5 Concluding Remarks References 8 A Dilemma for Eternalists 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The Dilemma 8.3 Some Options 8.4 An Upshot Reference Part II Identity 9 Identity and Extrinsicness 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Setting Up the Problem 9.3 Mackie on Best-Candidate Theories of Identity 9.4 Assessing Mackie 9.5 Conclusion References 10 Best Candidate Theories and Identity 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Best-Candidate Theories of Identity 10.3 Brennan's Interpretation 10.4 Assessing Brennan's Response 10.5 Final Words References 11 Possible Worlds and Identity 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Forbes's Cases 11.3 On Forbes's Grounded Transworld Identities 11.4 Conclusion References 12 Vague Identity and Vague Objects 12.1 Getting Clear About the Vague Identity Thesis 12.2 Considering the Ship of Theseus 12.3 Evans's Proof 12.4 Responses to Evans's Proof 12.5 The Correct Response to Evans's Proof 12.6 A General Result 12.7 Conclusion References 13 More on Rigidity and Scope 13.1 More's Thesis 13.2 More's Arguments 13.3 Why More's Arguments Fail 13.4 Conclusion References 14 Enduring Endurantism 14.1 Barker and Dowe's First Argument 14.2 Barker and Dowe's Second Argument 14.3 Barker and Dowe's Third Argument 14.4 Conclusion References 15 Identity of Truth-Conditions 15.1 Analysis Problem No. 19 15.2 The Solution Reference Part III The Self 16 Some Notes on Animalism 16.1 Animalism 16.2 Why Animalism Is True 16.3 Why Animalism Can't be True 16.4 A Familiar Analogy 16.5 Conclusion References 17 Persons and Human Beings 17.1 The Lockean Conception of Person 17.2 The Animal Attribute Conception of Persons 17.3 Evaluating the Two Conceptions of Persons 17.4 Conclusion References 18 The Story of `I': Comments on Rudder Baker's Constitution View of Persons 18.1 Introduction 18.2 Rudder Baker on Self-Consciousness and the First-Person 18.3 Rudder Baker on the First-Person Perspective 18.4 A General Worry About Rudder Baker's View 18.5 Rudder Baker on Personal Identity 18.6 Rudder Baker on the Determinacy of Personal Identity 18.7 Rudder Baker on Human Persons References 19 Personal Identity and Extrinsicness 19.1 Introduction 19.2 Wiggins on the Case of Division 19.3 The Challenge of Division 19.4 Best-Candidate Theories and theOnly a and b'' Condition
19.5 Extrinsicness of Personal Identity
19.6 Concluding Remarks
References
20 Personal Identity and Reductionism
20.1 Introduction
20.2 What Ontological Reduction Is
20.3 Ontological Reduction of Persons
20.4 Reductionism and What Matters
References
21 Bermúdez on Self-Consciousness
21.1 Introduction
21.2 Self-Consciousness, I'-Thoughts, and the DeflationaryTheory 21.3 Critique 21.4 Conclusion and Further Work References 22 Anscombe onI'
22.1 Introduction
22.2 Anscombe's Challenge
22.3 The Tank Argument
22.4 Supporting the Referential View
Reference
23 Wittgenstein on the First-Person
23.1 The Problem with I'-Judgements 23.2 Wittgenstein on the Two Uses ofI'
23.3 Analysing Wittgenstein's View
23.4 The I'-as-Subject and Self-Consciousness References 24 Persons and Values 24.1 Theories of Values and the Definition ofPerson'
24.2 The Case of Derek Parfit
24.3 Two Theses About Personal Identity and What Matters
24.4 The Argument from Analysis
24.5 The Argument from Division
24.6 The Argument from Reductionism
24.7 Conclusion
References
Part IV Afterthoughts
25 About Time
References
26 Affecting the Past
References
27 Of Identity
References
28 On Personal Identity
References
Name Index
Subject Index