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Tie-breaking rules and divisibility in experimental duopoly markets

✍ Scribed by Daniela Puzzello

Book ID: 116635322
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2008
Tongue: English
Weight: 498 KB
Volume: 67
Category: Article
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.09.002

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