In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant denies that the existence of God can be established by means of the physico-teleological proof, the argument from design. From the observation that the world seems to be ordered according to a plan we cannot conclude that this order is the work of an intelligence. The physico-teleological proof does, however, serve a useful purpose: it encourages us to seek and to establish the purposive relations among natural beings. In the terms of Kant's philosophy, the physicoteleological proof is a regulative idea of reason. It prescribes a task for the researcher and thinker, that of bringing about the greatest systematic unity within our knowledge of appearances.2 Science should consider the world as t'f it had been created according to a plan by divine intelligence. Kant produces other reasons for rejecting the argument from design. He claims that it can only serve to prove the necessity of an architect for nature, but that it cannot establish the wisdom or the omnipotence of the architect. He also claims that the argument from design ultimately presupposes the ontological argument, which he also rejects.
My discussion will deal with the first objection to the physico-teleological proof, rather than the last two. I want to argue that Kant revised his view of the theoretical validity of the proof in the Critique of Judgement.