Philosophers ancient and modern have argued for the connection between reason and morality. The arguments have so persisted as to suggest almost a self-glorifying inclination among philosophers who have claimed, sometimes tacitly, sometimes openly, to be the paradigms of the life of reason and, thus, of the moral life as well! The persistence of such a claim, however, exposes the defensive position of philosophers in society. That is, the philosophic activity has often been considered so subversive and dangerous as to require a defense showing why any society should be hospitable to it. As Leo Strauss and Allan Bloom have in recent years reminded us, 1 the locus classicus for the defense of philosophy to the polis or society is Plato's Republic. There, and in many works of Plato, Socrates contends that if we would think we would live better, by which he means not only live happier but also live more morally. The structure of the Platonic-Socratic argument has parallels in Confucian, Neo-Confucian, and Buddhist philosophy where it is often claimed that inquiry has inevitably beneficial effects on one's moral conduct. Thus, the Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yang-Ming asserts that "the investigation of things is the effort to make the will sincere." 2 Frederick Streng's account of the second century Indian philosopher Nftgfirjuna points to a connection between wisdom (prajfig), the apprehension of "emptiness" (~fmyat~), and compassion (karun. ~t). a There is indeed a certain plausibility to the claim that the activity of reasoning which demands fairness, objectivity and judiciousness carries over into the moral domain. In the light of this it seems more than coincidence that in The Republic the defense of justice finally turns into a defense of the intellectual life. 4 If we see clearly, then, i.e., if our apprehension of reality is not distorted by selfish desires or inclinations, we execute both cognitive and moral purifications. Two related arguments should be separated, however. The first * I wish to thank Lloyd Epstein, Terry Perlin, and Laszlo Vers6nyi for clarifying discussions of some of the issues in this paper.