I defend Kant's definition of analyticity in terms of concept "containment", which has engendered widespread skepticism. Kant deployed a clear, technical notion of containment based on ideas standard within traditional logic, notably genus/species hierarchies formed via logical division. Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction thereby undermines the logico-metaphysical system of Christian Wolff, showing that the Wolffian paradigm lacks the expressive power even to represent essential knowledge, including elementary mathematics, and so cannot provide an adequate system of philosophy. The results clarify the extent to which analyticity sensu Kant can illuminate the problem of a priori knowledge generally.
Introduction: Containment Analyticity and the Wolffian Paradigm
Kant defines analyticity in terms of concept "containment": a judgment is analytic just in case "the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A" (A 6/B 10) 1 . Few recent philosophers have been satisfied with the official definition. Many endorse the classical criticism, dating back to Maaß (1789), that the notion of containment is hopelessly obscure, because it must 0 For comments on earlier versions of this material, my thanks are due to Kit Fine, David Hills, John MacFarlane, Alison Simmons, and Ken Taylor, and audiences at Berkeley and NYU. In its current shape, the paper benefited from helpful criticisms by