The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

✍ Scribed by Jonathan L. Kvanvig

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Year: 2003
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 234
• Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
• Edition: First Edition
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology--that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its parts. Using Plato's Meno as a starting point, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that it is less valuable than generally assumed. The book will appeal to students and professional philosophers in epistemology.

✦ Table of Contents

Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 9
Introduction......Page 11
1 The Value of Knowledge Is External to It......Page 19
PLATO AND THE TETHERING OF TRUE BELIEF......Page 30
KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION......Page 39
2 The Value of True Belief......Page 46
THE VALUE OF BELIEF......Page 47
THE VALUE OF TRUTH......Page 56
EXTERNALIST ACCOUNTS......Page 62
JUSTIFICATIONIST ACCOUNTS......Page 70
TWO KINDS OF MEANS TO A GOAL......Page 78
Intentional Means and Reflective Transparency......Page 83
4 Reliabilism, Normativity, and the Special Promise of Virtue Epistemology......Page 94
ZAGZEBSKI’S VIRTUE THEORY......Page 97
VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND CREDIT FOR TRUE BELIEF......Page 99
A FURTHER BENEFIT OF VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY?......Page 117
CONCLUSION......Page 124
5 The Gettier Problem and the Value of Knowledge......Page 126
THE GETTIER PROBLEM......Page 127
GETTIER-LIKE CASES......Page 128
THE APPEAL TO ACCIDENTALITY AND A GENERAL CONCERN......Page 131
APPROACHES TO THE GETTIER PROBLEM......Page 135
COUNTERFACTUAL AND DEFEASIBILITY APPROACHES TO THE GETTIER PROBLEM......Page 143
CONCLUSION......Page 157
6 Knowledge as Irreducibly Valuable......Page 158
CURIOSITY AND THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE......Page 161
THE DESIRE TO KNOW......Page 168
CONCLUSION......Page 173
7 Epistemic Attitudinalism: Semantic and Pragmatic Approaches......Page 175
Field ’s Evaluativism......Page 176
Heller’s Contextualism......Page 181
Greco’s Credit Theory of Knowledge......Page 185
EPISTEMIC ATTITUDINALISM AND THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE......Page 188
THE FAILURE OF EPISTEMIC ATTITUDINALISM......Page 191
CONCLUSION......Page 202
8 Knowledge and Understanding......Page 203
UNDERSTANDING, KNOWLEDGE, AND LOGICAL FORM......Page 206
UNDERSTANDING IS NOT A SPECIES OF KNOWLEDGE......Page 214
THE VALUE OF UNDERSTANDING......Page 218
CONCLUSION......Page 220
9 Conclusion......Page 222
References......Page 225
Index......Page 231