The Value Gap

✍ Scribed by Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen

• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Year: 2022
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 238
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

In The Value Gap, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen addresses the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for, two value notions that are central to ethics and practical deliberation. The first part of the book argues against views that claim that one of these notions is
either faulty, or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. Whereas these two views disagree on whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed or dependent concept, it is argued, as against both approaches, that goodness and goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be
fully understood in terms of one another. The second part provides an analysis of good and good-for in terms of a fitting-attitude analysis. By elaborating a more nuanced understanding of the key elements of this analysis--reasons and pro-attitudes--Rønnow-Rasmussen challenges the widespread
idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas. The result is that the gap between favouring for a reason what is good and favouring for a reason what is good for someone appears insurmountable.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
The Value Gap
Copyright
Dedication
Preface
Contents
Acknowledgements
Part I: Elements
1: Value Taxonomy
1.1 Different Taxonomies
1.2 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Values
1.3 Final and Non-Final Values
1.4 Varieties of Non-Final (Extrinsic) Value
1.5 The Coherence of IE
2: Good and Good-For
2.1 Kinds of Positive Value
2.2 Less Interesting Senses of Good-For
2.3 Mooreans and Good-For Monists
2.4 Value Dualism
3: Challenging Mooreanism
3.1 Introducing a Debate
3.2 Overall and Pro Tanto Value
3.3 The Argument against Mooreanism
3.4 The Totality of Value
3.5 The Intuition of Neutrality and Value Monism
3.6 Relationalists and the Intuition of Neutrality
3.7 Non-Relationalists and the Intuition of Neutrality
4: Challenging Good-For Monism
4.1 Relationalist Strategies
4.2 Relationalism and Aggregation
4.3 Separating Value from Normativity
4.4 Good-For Monism and Thick Value Concepts
4.5 Reasons Provided by Relational Value
4.6 Relationalism, Supervenience, and Constitution
5: Good-For Unitarianism
5.1 The Background
5.2 Good-For Unitarianism
5.3 Disunitarianism
5.4 Well-Being
5.5 Thin and Thick Values
5.6 The Thickor Thinness of Good-For
5.7 Good-For and The Intuition of Neutrality
Part II: A Fitting-attitude Analysis Of Value
6: Fitting-Attitude Analysis
6.1 The New Agenda
6.2 FA Analysis and its Advantages
6.3 Brentano, Kriegel, Rowland, and the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
6.4 FA Analysis and the Moore/Brentano Challenge
6.5 A Reason’s Strength
6.6 The Real Agency Challenge to FA Analysis
6.7 The Value of Actuality
7: The Logical Consequence of Fitting Attitudes
7.1 The Property of Being an Intrinsic Property
7.2 FA Analysis and Value Dualism
7.3 The Normative Approach
7.4 The Logical Consequence Argument
8: The Fitting-Attitude Analysis Revised
8.1 The Combinatorial Account
8.2 Challenging the Arguments
8.3 Downgrading the Logical Consequence Argument
8.4 Redefining Final Goodness
8.5 A Substantive Argument Against P**
9: 'Sake’
9.1 For Pete’s Sake
9.2 The Untranslatability Objection
9.3 The Functional ‘Sake’
9.4 The Non-Evaluative ‘Sake’
9.5 Vocation and Being Struck by Personal Value
9.6 ‘Sake’ in FA Analysis
10: FA and Motivating Reasons
10.1 Two Issues
10.2 Introducing Some Terminology
10.3 Favourings and Motivating Reasons
11: Favouring for No Reason
11.1 Aim
11.2 Favourings Not Governed by Reason
11.3 Raz and Expressive Acts
11.4 Habits and Explanatory Reasons
11.5 The Dual-Role Requirement
11.6 Reasonm and Reasong
11.7 Two Challenging Cases: The Surprise Party and Placebo
11.8 Arguments from Intentional Overload, Complexity, and Form
12: Mind The Value Gap
12.1 On My Own Authority
12.2 The Width and the Profundity
12.3 Geachian Crossing
12.4 The Disapprovables—A Personality Response
12.5 Silencing
12.6 Incommensurable but Comparable
12.7 Two Kinds of Importance
12.8 Minding the Gap
References
Index