✦ LIBER ✦

The sufficient and necessary condition of the major stochastic preference rule in group decision making

✍ Scribed by Fan Ye, Naiming Dong, Jing Li, Zhenjie Hong

Book ID: 118813896
Publisher: Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Year: 2012
Tongue: English
Weight: 151 KB
Volume: 25
Category: Article
ISSN: 1009-6124
DOI: 10.1007/s11424-012-0258-3

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