The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism

✍ Scribed by Roy Gardner

• Book ID: 104638799
• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1980
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 448 KB
• Volume: 35
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0048-5829
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00140847

✦ Synopsis

In this paper, the problem of the Paretian liberal is cast as a preference revelation game whose outcome function satisfies Gibbard's libertarian condition and strong Pareto optimality. Strategic consistency requires that the equilibrium of the game agree with the sincere outcome. It is shown that, whether viewed in a cooperative or non-cooperative context, the liberal social choice function is strategically inconsistent. This result suggests that, from a strategic standpoint, a different resolution of the liberal paradox is desirable.