The stability of exchange networks

✍ Scribed by Gönül Doğan; Marcel A.L.M. van Assen; Arnout van de Rijt; Vincent Buskens

• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 2009
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 313 KB
• Volume: 31
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0378-8733
• DOI: 10.1016/j.socnet.2008.12.001

✦ Synopsis

Economic and sociological exchange theories predict divisions of exchange benefits given an assumed fixed network of exchange relations. Since network structure has been found to have a large impact on actors' payoffs, actors have strong incentives for network change. We answer the question what happens to both the network structure and actor payoffs when myopic actors change their links in order to maximize their payoffs. We investigate the networks that are stable, the networks that are efficient or egalitarian with varying tie costs, and the occurrence of social dilemmas. Only few networks are stable over a wide range of tie costs, and all of them can be divided into two types: efficient networks consisting of only dyads and at most one isolate, and Pareto efficient and egalitarian cycles with an odd number of actors. Social dilemmas are observed in even-sized networks at low tie costs.