Surveying and summarizing the basic issues corffronting Soviet decisionmakers in the next ten years as reflected in energy and international political terms, this analysis treats the capacity and constraints mediating Soviet influence in the resolution of the future world energy balance. A scenario highlighting a "Soviet-Preferred Future World" is developed that focuses on three classes of likely energy outcomes: (I) a gradual erosion of the Western commercial position in Middle East oil, (2) repeated shortages in oil-consumer states leading to a diversion of attention away from international matters and increased preoccupation with "domestic" energy woes, and (3) a deterioration of the terms of trade for energy importers vis g~ vis Soviet and noneommunist trading partners. The discussion concludes with an assessment of several of the key choices confronting the major oil-importing nations and requiring resolution.
As a global superpower, the Soviet Union cannot fail but to have a strong interest in any issue with ramifications as deep and far-reaching as the world energy situation. The USSR's proximity to and heavy involvement in the Middle East, the vortex of world oil concerns, only sharpens that interest. Even before Arab oil producers unleashed the "oil weapon" in October 1973, expectations about the future course of international oil transactions had already begun significantly to influence the foreign and domestic policies of a large number of world actors with whom Soviet foreign policy is deeply engaged. But while the Soviet Union is the world's second largest producer and consumer of liquid fuels, its interest in the world energy balance and in Middle East oil is not now as direct or immediate as that of the other large producers and consumers.