β Scribed by Michael Blome-Tillmann
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
In this book, Michael Blome-Tillmann offers a critical overview of the current debate on the semantics of knowledge attributions. The book is divided into five parts. Part 1 introduces the reader to the literature on 'knowledge' attributions by outlining the historical roots of the debate and providing an in-depth discussion of epistemic contextualism. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of the view, Part 2 offers a detailed investigation of epistemic impurism (or pragmatic encroachment views), while Part 3 is devoted to a careful examination of epistemic relativism and Part 4 to two different types of strict invariantism (psychological and pragmatic). The final part of the book explores Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism - a version of contextualism that is argued to provide a more powerful and elegant account of the semantics of 'knowledge' attributions than many of its competitors. A clear and precise account is provided of the main principles underlying each view and of how they aim to explain the pertinent data and resolve philosophical puzzles and challenges. The book also provides charts outlining the relations between the positions discussed and offers suggestions for further reading.
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgements
List of Figures
Introduction
PART I: EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM
1. Epistemic Contextualism
2. Semantic Implementations
3. Versions of Contextualism
4. Linguistic Objections
5. Philosophical Objections
PART II: EPISTEMIC IMPURISM
6. Epistemic Impurism
7. Problems and Objections
PART III: EPISTEMIC RELATIVISM
8. Epistemic Relativism
PART IV: STRICT INVARIANTISM
9. Psychological Invariantism
10. Pragmatic Invariantism
PART V: PRESUPPOSITIONAL EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM
11. The Presupposition Effect
12. Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism
References
Index
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
<P>This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between <EM>de dicto</EM>, <EM>de re</EM>, and <EM>de se</EM> beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a spec
This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a special sort of object-dependent s
<p><P>This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between <EM>de dicto</EM>, <EM>de re</EM>, and <EM>de se</EM> beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a s