This paper assesses the role of the Refutation of Idealism within the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as its relation to the treatment of idealism in the First Edition and to transcendental idealism more generally. It will be argued that the Refutation of Idealism and the Fourth Paralogism of the First Edition are consistent and that their consistence can be explained by reference to the distinction between appearances and phenomena. While the Fourth Paralogism appeals to the fact that space is a form of intuition to establish that the immediate objects of awareness, namely appearances, that are represented as being in space really are in space and classify as spatial objects, the Refutation attempts to show that at least some of these outer appearances are empirically real and have objective correlates, namely phenomena. By appealing to this distinction we can make sense of the idea that the Refutation is an extension of the Transcendental Deduction. While the Deduction, considered on its own, constitutes a 'regressive argument', the Refutation allows us to turn the Transcendental Analytic into a 'progressive argument' that proceeds by the synthetic method -the method that Kant attributed to the Critique in the Prolegomena. Accordingly, we will see that the Refutation occupies a crucial role in the Analytic. This understanding of the Refutation as attempting to establish the existence of phenomena that correspond to empirically real appearances also explains why Kant placed the Refutation of Idealism after the Second Postulate, rather than leaving it in the Transcendental Dialectic amongst the Paralogisms.