In his 1975 paper, Nordhaus formally proves that governments whose aim is to be reelected, will generate 'political' business cycles. Empirical results do not confirm this proposition, especially in countries used to early elections. We show that if there is a non-zero probability for elections to
β¦ LIBER β¦
The rational timing of parliamentary elections
β Scribed by Nathan S. Balke
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1990
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 873 KB
- Volume
- 65
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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