๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

The problem of evil revisited a reply to Schlesinger

โœ Scribed by Jay F. Rosenberg


Publisher
Springer
Year
1970
Tongue
English
Weight
476 KB
Volume
4
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-5363

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

โœฆ Synopsis


The twist that Dr. Scb_lesinger gives the classical problem of evil is as ingenious as it is novel. 1 Classically, the problem arises from an evident incompatibility between the theists' claims concerning God, on the one hand, and the manifest state of the world, on the other. God, asserts the theist, is an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly benevolent being. On the face of it, to claim that such a being created and sustains the world in which we find ourselves is absurd. That world is, in large measure, a hostile place, exhibiting pain, disease, and various cruelties. Within the limits of our knowledge and to the best of our abilities, we strive to better the human condition. When and where we can, we alleviate pain, cure disease, and check human cruelty. Not to do so would be morally wrong. Should we fail through lack of knowledge, skill, or means, we are, of course, blameless, for human resources are limited and ignorance frequently unavoidable. But to fail through lack of concern is to incur proper and justified moral censure.

But from an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent being, what might we not expect? Surely nothing less than the best of all possible worlds! For how could such a being fail to. produce the best? Not, certainly, through lack of ability. The ability of an omnipotent being is unbounded. Nor could he fail through lack of knowledge. For an omniscient being there is no ignorance. Given the benevolent concern of which the theist assures us, it would seem that the only rational expectation is of a perfect world, a world free of pain, disease, cruelty and suffering -in short, the best of all possible worlds. Candide is the paradigm of a consistent theist.

Sadly, however, Candide is equally a paradigm of naivet6. In any sense of the words which we can understand, this is not the best of all possible worlds. And, of course, we are limited to such senses. As Schlesinger himself points out, * This paper was presented as part of a departmental colloquium at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, in April, 1969. It represents the first typographical precipitation of what has been an intermittent verbal debate between Dr. Schlesinger and myself since he presented an early version of his paper to the Pittsburgh department in 1963. The body of my paper is reproduced here as it was read, but the incisive comments of my colleagues at Chapel Hill are responsible for its enrichment by three footnotes.


๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


An approach to the problem of evil
โœ M. B. Ahern ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1963 ๐Ÿ› Springer Netherlands ๐ŸŒ English โš– 653 KB