๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

The prisoner's dilemma is an unexploitable Newcomb problem

โœ Scribed by Philip Pettit

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Year
1988
Tongue
English
Weight
604 KB
Volume
76
Category
Article
ISSN
0039-7857

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

The value of information in Newcomb's Pr
The value of information in Newcomb's Problem and the Prisoners' Dilemma
โœ Paul Snow ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1985 ๐Ÿ› Springer US ๐ŸŒ English โš– 199 KB

The acts in Newcomb's Problem and the Prisoner's Dilemma are viewed as experiments. The cost of the information yielded by each act-experiment is compared to the value of information in the two problems, which is zero. The non-dominant act-experiments cost more than their information is worth, and a

An impartial reasoning solution to the p
An impartial reasoning solution to the prisoner's dilemma
โœ Norman Frohlich ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1992 ๐Ÿ› Springer US ๐ŸŒ English โš– 849 KB

The notion that fairness can be determined by using impartial reasoning is examined and an argument is advanced that experimental methods can be used to determine what is fair in certain well-defined contexts. Implications for the prisoner's dilemma are examined. The standard game theoretic prescrip

No Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in
No Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
โœ Jeffrey Lorberbaum ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1994 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 704 KB

Following the influential work of Axelrod, the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game has become the theoretical gold standard for understanding the evolution of co-operative behavior among unrelated individuals. Using the game, several authors have found that a reciprocal strategy known as Tit for Tat (T