In his discussion I of Doing the Best We Can 2, Tomberlin says many kind words for which I am very grateful. In addition to these kind words, Tomberlin also offers some criticism. His main critical point is that, as he sees it, the DBWC approach does not provide a solution to the Paradox of the Knower. In this reply, I briefly present what I take to be the Paradox of the Knower; I show how it can be treated within the DBWC system; and I discuss another possible complaint.
Tomberlin presents an admirably clear account of the Paradox of the Knower? He tells a brief story about a security guard (Jones) and an arsonist (Smith). The story could easily be true, and if it were true, the following sentences of ordinary English would also be true:
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Smith set the store on fire while Jones was on duty. 2. If Smith set the store on fire while Jones was on duty, Jones ought to know that Smith set the store on fire.
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Smith ought not to set the store on fire.
There is nothing paradoxical about these sentences. Trios of sentences relevantly like these are often true. A difficulty may arise, however, when we attempt to represent these sentences within some formal system. It may turn out that the most natural formal representations of (1)--(3) in the system are inconsistent. Since the originals are consistent, this would show that the formal representation is somehow inadequate.
Suppose there were a formal system in which our sentences were represented as follows: 1'. f 2'. f--" Ok 3". O-f Philosophical Studies 55 (1989) 93--100.