Redistribution of income is a function of the state. In Buchanan (1975) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980) redistribution of income permits wider gains from trade beyond those obtained with the enforcement of rights and the provision of public goods. In a post-constitutional era, income redistribution may be required to allow for the continuation of those gains from trade and to prevent the collapse of the constitutional agreement. Tullock (1983Tullock ( , 1986) ) has argued that a great deal of public expenditure (e.g., Social Security, Medicare, Education, etc.) and public policy (e.g., tariffs, regulation, etc.) inherently is redistributive. Special interest coalitions seek transfers and politicians supply redistribution, mainly through logrolling. In the public finance tradition of Musgrave (1959), the state provides public goods, stabilizes the economy and redistributes income. All of these fiscal functions have implications for income redistribution.
An argument in a voter's utility function is his place in the income distribution. Ceteris paribus, a voter will select a candidate whose views come closest to his own. In a one issue campaign, those who would gain (lose) from income redistribution would vote for (against) those candidates who favored (opposed) redistribution. Since the income distribution is skewed and the political rules of one man one vote and majority rule exist, there would be a movement toward more income equality. However, place in the income distribution is one of many issues confronting the polity. In a multidimensional election nothing can be said about the appropriate set of positions which will win the election. 1
Despite an inability to successfully model the complex electoral process, * We thank the editor for constructive comments. The usual caveat applies.