This book argues against the view that mathematical knowledge is a priori, contending that mathematics is an empirical science and develops historically, just as natural sciences do. Kitcher presents a complete, systematic, and richly detailed account of the nature of mathematical knowledge and it
The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge
โ Scribed by Philip Kitcher
- Year
- 1985
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 300
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
This book argues against the view that mathematical knowledge is a priori, contending that mathematics is an empirical science and develops historically, just as natural sciences do. Kitcher presents a complete, systematic, and richly detailed account of the nature of mathematical knowledge and its historical development, focusing on such neglected issues as how and why mathematical language changes, why certain questions assume overriding importance, and how standards of proof are modified.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
This book argues against the view that mathematical knowledge is a priori, contending that mathematics is an empirical science and develops historically, just as natural sciences do. Kitcher presents a complete, systematic, and richly detailed account of the nature of mathematical knowledge and it
This book argues against the view that mathematical knowledge is a priori, contending that mathematics is an empirical science and develops historically, just as natural sciences do. Kitcher presents a complete, systematic, and richly detailed account of the nature of mathematical knowledge and its
<p>This book explains exactly what human knowledge is. The key concepts in this book are structures and algorithms, i.e., what the readers โseeโ and how they make use of what they see. Thus in comparison with some other books on the philosophy (or methodology) of science, which employ a syntactic ap
<P>This study addresses a central theme in current philosophy: Platonism vs Naturalism and provides accounts of both approaches to mathematics, crucially discussing Quine, Maddy, Kitcher, Lakoff, Colyvan, and many others. Beginning with accounts of both approaches, Brown defends Platonism by arguing