The nature of evolutionary theory: The semantic challenge

✍ Scribed by Peter B. Sloep; Wim J. Steen

• Publisher: Springer Netherlands
• Year: 1987
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 919 KB
• Volume: 2
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0169-3867
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00127559

✦ Synopsis

Philosophy of science should have a visible function in the assessment of scientific theories. Classically, theories were viewed as syntactic structures tied indirectly, through correspondence rules, to the realm of phenomena. This conception came to be known as the Received View. Today, heavily under attack, this view occurs in a confusing array of philosophical writings. Meanwhile the so-called Semantic View is offered as a worthy alternative. It introduces semantic interpretations right from the start, and thus seems to leave more room for pluralism within domains of science. Proponents of this view have recently introduced it into the realm of evolutionary biology. Some of them have argued that the Semantic View is more faithful to science as it appears in practice and that it has the power of accomodating biology as a non-general science. The present paper aims at showing that this defence of the Semantic View falls short of making it the best candidate for philosophical analysis of biological theories. Extant philosophical views (syntactic or semantic) of scientific theories are so complex that they can hardly be helpful for the practice of science. A simpler approach is indicated.