in his thoughtful Note 1 offers a brief exposition of the DDS solution to the problem of evil. It is the solution based on the thesis that a moral agent's central obligation is to strive to increase, to the utmost of his ability, everybody's Degree of Desirability of State. From an objective point of view, whether a subject actually desires it or not, and regardless how high his DDS may already be, it could always further be raised. Given that God's power is unlimited, it is logically impossible for Him to ensure that the desirability of anyone's state does not fall short of what it could be. Thus as O'Connor explains, since "... no being can be morally obliged either to achieve or to attempt the logically impossible, God is not obliged to try" (p. 246) to cause His creatures reaching the highest DDS.
O'Connor states that the numerous objections raised against the DDS solution during the last twenty years or so have convincingly been disposed of, and that I certainly find gratifying. However, he then goes on to develop quite a remarkable and novel line of attack. It seems to me that his argument requires a certain amount of modification to be effective. If presented in a proper way, his point may indeed amount to a damaging criticism of the earlier, incomplete version of the DDS solution. We shall see however that the more recent, fuller and more refined account is capable of adequately handling O'Connor's objection. II O'Connor touches upon a vital issue when he points out that the DDS solution may eliminate the grounds for ascribing any evil to God, but it still leaves us with the serious problem, in what sense can He be said to be morally good.