Most analyses of proper names, and of sentences in which proper names occur as logical subject, would have it that something is amiss when a proper-name-like term fails to refer to anything. Suppose that Smith says to us:
(1)
Arthur Jones has brown hair.
and, since we don't know of anyone named Arthur Jones we ask for further clarification; suppose Smith replies that he doesn't know (or know of) anyone named Arthur Jones either, and that in uttering (1) he wasn't, in fact, referring to anyone at all. It seems reasonable to say (following the view of Searle and others) that in uttering (1) Smith failed to make any assertion, since his use of the proper name 'Arthur Jones' did not serve to mention anyone. Further, since no assertion was made, there is no question of the truth or falsity of an assertion. But, in following this line we quickly encounter problems with
(2) Hamlet was prince of Denmark.
We assume that there was no prince of Denmark named Hamlet, and in addition, that 'Hamlet' here is a fictional proper name, that is, it shows up in a work of fiction, but fails to refer to any real person at all. 'Hamlet', then, like 'Arthur Jones' in (1) does not serve to mention anyone. But it is our intuition that (2) can be used to make a true assertion. What is needed, then, is some scheme which preserves the analysis of (1) as not used to make an assertion, but allows that (2) can be used to make a true assertion; we shall consider various candidates for an analysis of the use of proper names of fictitious characters, and propose one we think is adequate.
- We shall immediately reject a proposal someone might be tempted to