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The marriage problem: From the bar of appointments to the agency

✍ Scribed by Alejandro Lage-Castellanos; Roberto Mulet


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2006
Tongue
English
Weight
333 KB
Volume
364
Category
Article
ISSN
0378-4371

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis


We study the stable marriage problem from different points of view. We proposed a microscopic dynamic that led the system to a stationary state that we are able to characterize analytically. Then, we derive a thermodynamical description of the Nash equilibrium states of the system that agree very well with the results of Monte Carlo simulations. Finally, through large-scale numerical simulations we compare the global optimum of the society with the stable marriage of lower energy. We showed that both states are strongly correlated and that the selfish attitude results in a benefit for most of the practitioners belonging to blocking pairs in the global optimum of the society.


πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


Bistable Versions of the Marriages and R
✍ B.P. Weems πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1999 πŸ› Elsevier Science 🌐 English βš– 291 KB

A stable matching for an instance of the stable marriages problem or the stable roommates problem is bistable if it is also a stable matching when the ordering of the input preference lists is reversed. For the stable marriages problem, it is shown that the bistable matchings are a sublattice of the